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Perhaps one of the most discussed and debated issues today facing teachers, teacher evaluators and
academic leadership, in general, is the determination of the most useful method of assessing
instructional effectiveness.  Certainly this is neither a new idea nor a novel focus.  The concept and
process of evaluating a teacher’s impact on student achievement has been a topic of interest to the
field of education for some time, but one aspect of the current emphasis is directly related to the
determination of appropriate methods for the monetary rewarding of educators for their level of
instructional influence.
The discussion among invested parties appears to suggest that the single-salary schedule
model of remuneration for educators is losing some of its support in favor of a differentiated
compensation approach.  Whether one refers to this orientation as “merit pay” (Evans, 2001, p.
48), “performance-related pay” (Podgursky & Springer, 2006, p.4) or “pay-for-performance
programs” (Burns & Gardner, 2010, para. 4), the message is clear: Educator compensation is a topic
of critical importance to the school reform discussion. Although conversations “about pay for
performance for teachers go back as early as 1867 and were part of almost every decade of the last
century” (Springer & Gardner, 2010, p.8), this practice has taken on intensified importance, due in no
small part, to the legislative reform agenda associated with the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (ARRA) and the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),
also known as the No Child Left Behind Act.
Legislative Reform Agenda’s Emphasis on Pay-for-Performance
One of the areas of focus of The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 was
teacher efficacy, and in particular, pay-for-performance approaches (Burns & Gardner, 2010; Ellerson,
2010; Laine, Potemski, & Rowland, 2010).  Two programs funded through ARRA which directly relate
to the issue of aligning teacher pay with effectiveness are the Teacher Incentive Fund and Race to the
Top (Laine et al.).  The Teacher Incentive Fund specifically notes as one of its goals the reformation of
compensation programs for principals and teachers to reward improvements in student attainment
(Teacher Incentive Fund, 2010), while one of the areas of emphasis of the Race to the Top program is
to revise “teacher evaluation, compensation, and retention policies to encourage and reward
effectiveness” (The White House, President Barack Obama, 2009, para. 6).
The practice of educator pay-for-performance was provided with additional impetus with the publication
of A Blueprint for Reform, The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in
March 2010 (United States Department of Education, 2010).  Within this blueprint may be found
multiple references to the relationship between educator effectiveness and compensation.  Moreover,
while other variables may be considered, it is clear from this document that educator effectiveness and
consequent financial rewards are aligned in large part to the measurement of student growth.  For
example, grantees of the Teacher and Leader Innovation Fund, noted in this blueprint, “may use funds
to reform compensation systems to provide differentiated compensation and career advancement
opportunities to educators who are effective in increasing student academic achievement” (United
States Department of Education, p.16).
This emphasis on directly linking teacher compensation to student achievement has met with mixed
reviews from the educational establishment.  While most would agree that student achievement is, in
fact, a reasonable, if not ultimate indicator of teacher effectiveness, numerous variables may enter into
its measurement equation.   Certainly differentiated compensation is a matter of great interest to all
teachers and administrators, but that discourse is beyond the scope of this discussion.  Rather, the
focus of the remainder of this article will be on special educators who work with students with
disabilities.  It is vital that specific concerns of this population of educators be included in this early
stage of the conversation to ensure the equity of such a high stakes assessment option.
While many questions may arise regarding pay-for-performance for special educators, an issue which
appears to be one of the most central to the discussion is the determination of the specific criteria
related to student achievement by which the educator will be judged.  This concern is compounded by
the very nature of the role of special educators, in that they may function in diverse roles in both an
instructional and consultative manner, and in a variety of settings, including collaborating and co-
teaching in the general education classroom.  Although there are certainly other aspects to consider in
regard to compensation for special educators, these two issues, namely, the criteria for determining
financial rewards and the impact that co-teaching may have on this determination, will be the particular
focal points of the following discussion.
The Issue of Criteria for Compensation 
If in fact, teacher effectiveness and resulting compensation levels will be in large part related to student
growth, as the growing trend seems to indicate, a major question regarding special educators
becomes evident: Which measure(s)/method(s) should be used to determine/verify achievement for
students with disabilities?  In their discussion of reforming compensation for educators, Burns and
Gardner (2010) note that a great majority of current approaches to performance pay depend
exclusively on standardized assessment scores as their principal determining factor.  The use of this
type of assessment as a primary determinant for teacher effectiveness for special educators could be
quite problematic.
Many special educators work with students with more severe disabilities and who are being taught an
alternative curriculum often focusing on life skills and/or behavioral strategies.  Generally, the
achievement levels of these students are assessed using alternative assessment measures, such as
portfolios or other non-standardized approaches.  If test scores are to be used as a measure of teacher
effectiveness, then there must be recognition that alternative assessment results for appropriate
students should be afforded equal value to standardized scores.
Numerous other special educators work with students with disabilities through instruction in the general
education curriculum, often with accommodations.  Special educators often co-teach and collaborate
with general educators, provide instructional adjustments/adaptations to the general education
curriculum for the students with disabilities, and supplement/reinforce instruction provided by the
general education teacher.  Because they may not always be considered the teacher of record for the
students with disabilities in inclusive classrooms for assessment purposes, their role in this setting
aligns itself to a great extent with the majority of educators who teach a subject matter area or grade
level not generally assessed though state-mandated standardized assessment.
The point that a minority of educators teach the core academic areas generally assessed through
standardized testing was made by Crouse (2006), who noted that a mere 31 percent  of classroom
teachers in Florida in the 2004-2005 academic year taught math and reading (Crouse, 2006, as cited
in Prince, Schuermann, Guthrie, Witham, Milanowski, & Thorn, 2009).  Facts such as this beg the
question of what happens with the remaining 69 percent of teachers, including special educators,
regarding fair and equitable compensation if standardized test scores are considered a primary
determinant for pay-for-performance decisions.  As noted in the report of the Center for Educator
Compensation Reform, entitled, The Other 69Percent: Fairly Rewarding the Performance of
Teachers of Nontested Subjects and Grades:
         Identifying highly effective teachers of subjects, grades, and students who are not tested with
standardized achievement tests – such as teachers of art, music, physical education, foreign
languages, K-2, high school, English language learners, and students with disabilities -
necessitates a different approach. It is important that states and districts provide viable options
for measuring the progress of these groups of students and the productivity of their teachers,
both of which contribute to school performance. (Prince et al., 2009, p.1).
It seems clear that a strict dependence on standardized test results as the sole or even primary
indicator of student growth and consequent teacher compensation for special educators is challenging,
to say the least.  Perhaps a more appropriate alternative would be the use of growth models, which
would focus on the progress of individual students over a time period as well as subpopulations of
students (Ahearn, 2009; McConnell, 2007; National Association of State Directors of Special
Education, Inc., n.d; Ziegler, 2007).  A growth model method being discussed in much of the literature
on differentiated compensation is that of a value-added approach (e.g., Baker & Shank, 2010; Eckert
& Dabrowski, 2010; Heneman III, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007; Koppich, 2005; Podgursky & Springer,
2007).
Value-added models (VAMs) are a specific type of growth model that is used to determine
the growth of individual students in the span of a school year. Student assessment using a
value-added model reflects student performance at a minimum of two points in time
with two dimensions of measuring assumed. One dimension is the increase in student
achievement. The second is a determination of how much the given school setting or
teacher has contributed to the increase in student achievement or the value added (Baker &
Shank, 2010, p.9).
While value-added growth models may be relatively simple or increasingly complex, the concept is
being considered as a way of potentially equalizing the playing field for pay-for-performance for special
educators.  The National Association of State Directors of Special Education, Inc. (n.d.) emphasizes
the importance of measuring the individual growth of students to ensure that teachers working with
challenging students or those who do not achieve a particular projected level of accomplishment, are
still recognized and compensated for their efforts.
The practice, however, is not without limitations and critics.  Concerns have been raised in regard to
growth models and value-added approaches for assessing teacher effectiveness, including the issue
of quantifying the results of students with disabilities whose achievement is measured through
alternative assessment based on alternative standards of achievement (Ahearn, 2009), as well as the
inadequacy of such methods in painting a complete picture of teacher effectiveness on student growth
for compensation purposes (Burns & Gardner, 2010; Fuhrman, 2010; Hershberg & Robertson-Kraft,
2010; Welner, 2008).
Although the conversation may appear somewhat imprecise at this point as to the most effective
method of measuring the growth of students with disabilities, particularly as it relates to high stakes
teacher compensation, two facts are becoming abundantly clear.  First, although value-added methods
may be considered by some as crucial to the discussion of educator pay reform (Eckert & Dabrowski,
2010), it appears as if more research should be completed in regard to teacher evaluation models and
their effects, both for special educators, (Council for Exceptional Children, 2010; Teacher Education
Division Council for Exceptional Children & Higher Education Consortium for Special Education
(HECSE), 2010) and as a general course of action.  As Podgursky & Springer (2007) note:
The evaluation literature is not sufficiently robust to prescribe how systems should be
designed (e.g., optimal size of bonuses, mix of individual vs. group incentives). However,
it is sufficiently positive to support much more extensive field trials, pilot programs, and
policy experiments, combined with careful follow-up evaluation (p.551).
Secondly, such high stakes teacher assessment for educators, in general, and special educators, in
particular, warrants the use of multiple measures   A single criterion does not begin to address the
variety of roles a special education teacher may be expected to assume in an array of educational
environments, nor account for the sometimes erratic student growth indicators of students with
disabilities. “Year-to-year learning gains may be highly idiosyncratic for students with disabilities, which
is precisely why these students have individualized education programs” (Prince et al., 2009, p. 29). 
The Council for Exceptional Children (2010) is particularly supportive of the idea of a multiple measure
evaluation system for improving the reliability and validity of decision-making, which could include such
components as student work samples, observations, and examples of family/community involvement.
The Issue of Co-Teaching
A second major issue of concern regarding special educators relates to the impact that co-teaching
students with general educators will have on the determination of their effectiveness and resulting
financial compensation.  The inclusion of students with disabilities in general education classrooms is
quite commonplace, and collaborating between special and general educators is a hallmark of
instruction in this setting, whether the special educator is there on an itinerant or full-time basis, or
acting in more of a consultative manner.  While co-teaching is an effective and supported educational
practice, the partnership in instruction and responsibility clearly needs to be addressed in the
discussion of pay-for-performance options.
There is some debate in the professional literature as to the effect that pay-for-performance will have
on collaborative relationships.  There is a sense that differentiated compensation may have a
deleterious effect on the collaborative process, so essential in a co-teaching relationship, because of
its potential to generate an environment of competition between educators (Burns & Gardner, 2010;
Solmon, 2004; Wyman & Allen, 2001).  Yet there are also those who reject the idea that an appropriate
pay-for-performance system will instigate detrimental competitiveness among personnel and instead
contend that it lends itself to supporting partnership and collaborative relationships  as teachers are
assessed against a predetermined criterion of the of the district or school (Plucker, Zapf, & McNabb,
2005). Regardless of which side of this argument one’s position falls, one has to consider that pay-for-
performance is a probable reality and if co-teaching is to continue as an effective and successful
instructional strategy, then a way must be found for the teachers involved to be rewarded
appropriately.   This author agrees with the Council for Exceptional Children (2010), who in its
recommendations for the reauthorization of ESEA, addresses the issue succinctly and
straightforwardly, stipulating that “differentiated compensation systems must be designed to increase
and reward collaboration and teamwork” (p.4).
While the mandate is clear, the question is how to fulfill it equitably.  Before a differentiated
compensation system can succeed in a co-teaching environment, much more discussion must
transpire and questions addressed.  For example, in an inclusive classroom where both a general and
special educator collaboratively teach students with and without disabilities, how does one differentiate
the influence of each teacher on the achievement levels of particular students?   “It is not clear how a
student’s achievement might be divided to account for the instruction received from a special educator
and instruction received from the general educator” (Teacher Education Division Council for
Exceptional Children & Higher Education Consortium for Special Education(HECSE), 2010, p.2).
 Moreover, this question becomes even more complex when considering the input of resource
personnel, such as speech therapists and paraprofessionals (Prince et al., 2009).
Because of this difficulty of delineating each educator’s impact on student growth in an inclusive
classroom, individual evaluation of teachers and related personnel in this type of setting for the purpose
of pay-for-performance rewards seems at best difficult, if not unreasonable.    Rather some type of
group approach for compensation seems appropriate.    One option discussed by Prince et al. (2009)
for pay-for-performance for special educators would be a system based on gains made school-wide. In
other words, special educators would receive financial rewards if the school’s performance as a whole
improves.  While this may be a consideration for additional discussion, it seems to this author that an
even more appropriate alternative for financially rewarding special educators in a co-teaching setting is
to focus on the team of individuals collaboratively working with the students, and reward the team for
improved student achievement. (Lignugaris-Kraft, as cited in “Special Ed Groups,” 2010; Prince et al.,
2009). Collaborative teaching seems to necessitate collaboratively determined financial
compensation.  This approach seems much more conducive to the cooperative philosophy of inclusion
and less inclined to foster competitiveness among the team of educators involved.
Certainly, as indicated in the previous discussion on criteria, the determination of student growth should
be only one factor for consideration of financial rewards for the special educator, whether the
instructional setting is an inclusive classroom with an emphasis on co-teaching or other alternatives on
the continuum of educational placements.  Multiple measures of teacher effectiveness should be
considered in a differentiated compensation model.
Conclusion
While it is still a topic surrounded by controversy, it is clear that pay-for-performance is an option that is
receiving increasing support from a legislative and professional perspective.   It is a topic of great
interest in the school reform agenda to a variety of interested parties, including academic leadership
personnel and those involved in special education.  As special educators often assume a diversity of
role functions in a variety of instructional settings, it is imperative to include consideration of specific
issues in their regard, such as those discussed herein, if differentiated compensation is to truly be an
equitable option.  Moreover issues such as these should be discussed proactively, prior to widespread
implementation of alternative compensation practices.  Personnel related to special education
programming need to be active participants in the conversation, particularly since “measuring the
productivity of teachers of students with disabilities is perhaps the single most difficult challenge of
designing a performance-pay system that includes all teachers” (Prince et al.,2009, p. 31).  It is hoped
that this discussion has contributed in some small measure to meeting this challenge and added to the
continually evolving framework upon which an effective and equitable differentiated compensation
system may be devised for all educators.
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